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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The jurisdiction is proper before this Court under the
provisions of §78-2a-3(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether it was an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to
set the amount of alimony based upon the parties' standard
of living prior to separation, rather than on the standard
of living considering the parties' respective incomes at
time of trial.

II.

Whether it was an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to
declare the home, currently titled in the Plaintiff's name,
as marital property to be divided, rather than to accept the
quit-claim deed given by Defendant to Plaintiff prior to the
parties' separation and treat the home as Plaintiff's
separate property.

III. Whether it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
deny Plaintiff an award of attorney's fees where the income
of the parties showed her need for such an award, the
reasonableness of the fees was undisputed and the
Defendant's income showed he had the ability to pay her
attorney fees.
IV.

Whether or not the Trial Court erred in denying judgment
interest on payments to Plaintiff upon a judgment for
temporary alimony awarded to her prior to the trial herein.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Joy Hoagland (hereinafter "Plaintiff") filed an action
for divorce against her husband, Colin Hoagland (hereinafter
"Defendant") on August 28. 1989.

Record, p. 001.

This case was

tried before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, District Court Judge,
on the 28th day of October, 1991.

Trial Transcript, p. 1.

The

court took the matter under advisement and issued its Memorandum
Decision on the 7th day of November,, 1991. jR^, p. 272.
Thereafter, counsel for Defendant prepared the initial Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law as well as the Decree of Divorce.
R. p. 293.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the

Decree of Divorce, were entered with the Court on the 4th day of
December, 1991. R^ pp. 293, 303.

Plaintiff filed her Objection

to Entry of Findings of Fact on December 12, 1991, R^, p. 307,
leading to the eventual filing of the Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, R^ p. 335, and a Second Amended Findings
of Fact. R^ p. 355.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Elko, Nevada on
September 5, 1973.

Tr. p. 7.

When they were first married, they

resided in Plaintiff's house in Ogden for approximately two
years. Tr. pp. 11-12.

In 1975, the Defendant convinced the
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Plaintiff to sell her house and use the equity money of the
Plaintiff's house to purchase another house.

Tr. p. 15.

In

1978, Defendant and Plaintiff decided to start a family
partnership to run a grocery business.

Tr. p. 117. That

partnership consisted of the Plaintiff, the Defendant, the
Defendant's brother, and the Plaintiff's son.

Tr. p. 118.

The

business was so successful that they added two more stores. Tr.
p. 123.

During this time, the Plaintiff was working as a

bookkeeper^and a checker at the stores. Tr. p. 29. At one point,
the Defendant did not want the Plaintiff to work at the stores,
because Defendant had a girlfriend, "Kay," that worked there.
Tr., p. 31.

The Plaintiff was told by the Defendant that "he

didn't want any part of my [Plaintiff's] hc^e, and he wanted me
[Plaintiff] out of the business."

Tr. p. 2-?.

In May 1986, the Defendant wanted to incorporate the
business.

Tr. pp. 32, 122. The Plaintiff was already out of the

store (i.e., she was told not to work there), and the Defendant
desired to buy out Defendant's ownership interest in the
business.

He told the Plaintiff that he would give her a quit-

claim deed to the house in exchange for her ownership interest in
the business.

Tr. p. 32. Both before and after the quit-claim

deed was signed and recorded, there had been no creditors
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contacting the Plaintiff.

Tr. p. 33. At approximately the same

time the quit-claim deed was given to her, two corporations were
formed with the assets of the partnership.

Tr. p. 121.

Fall of 1986, the corporations filed for bankruptcy.

In the

Tr. p. 122.

Just prior to the bankruptcy, the Defendant and his brother
brought between eight and nine thousand dollars in cash into
Plaintiff's home.

Tr. pp. 18-20.

In January 1987, the Defendant moved to Las Vegas,
Nevada to accept a position with Smith's Management.

Tr. p. 8.

In April 1987, Defendant invited Plaintiff to fly down to Nevada
to see him. Tr. pp. 9-10.

During that trip, Defendant told

Appellant that he would be in Nevada one more week, and then come
back home.

Tr. p. 10. He later decided not to come home, but

rather that they should get a divorce.
In April 1989, Plaintiff had to get a job as a seasonal
employee with the Internal Revenue Service.

Tr. p. 44.

The divorce action was filed by the Plaintiff on August
29, 1989.

R^ p. 1.

Defendant was served with a Summons and a

Complaint and with an Order to Show Cause for temporary support.
R. pp. 5-10.
counterclaim.

Defendant filed an answer to the complaint and a
FL_ p. 27. A hearing on the Order to Show Cause

pertaining to temporary support was held.

R^_ p. 11. The
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Defendant did not appear at the Hearing, and did not file any
responsive pleadings thereto.

Id.

Temporary alimony was awarded

to Plaintiff in the amount of $1,500 per month.

FL_ pp. 22-26.

At the time of trial, the Defendant owed to the Plaintiff back
alimony in the amount of $27,507.00. R^ p. 359.
$21,935.00

Of this amount,

had been reduced to judgment in a hearing held five

months prior to trial. jR^ pp. 152-156.
After trial on this matter, the Second District Court
awarded to the Plaintiff a Decree of Divorce, FL_ p. 303, and in
the Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, held, inter

alia,

that the standard of living the parties

enjoyed during the marriage would be determined as of the time of
separation instead of as of the time of trial, R^ p. 274; that
the home was a marital asset rather than an asset solely of the
Plaintiff, R^ p. 276; that the parties were to pay their own
attorney's fees, R^ p. 277; and that the back alimony owed to the
Plaintiff by the Defendant could be paid in payments without
interest, R^ pp. 276-277. The Plaintiff then brought this
Appeal.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

WHETHER IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCREITON FOR THE
TRIAL COURT TO SET THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY BASED
UPON THE PARTIES' STANDARD OF LIVING PRIOR TO
SEPARATION, RATHER THAN ON THE STANDARD OF LIVING
CONSIDERING THE PARTIES' RESPECTIVE INCOMES AT THE
TIME OF TRIAL.
Utah precedents indicate that where a divorce involves

parties that were married for a long time and where the husband's
income rose dramatically between separation and trial, that the
appropriate standard of living is to be determined at the time of
trial, basically asking what the standard of living would have
been had they remained together.

Further, the imperative to

determine the value of marital assets at the time of trial is
upheld by this analysis.
II.

WHETHER IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE
TRIAL COURT TO DECLARE THE HOME, CURRENTLY TITLED
IN THE PLAINTIFF'S NAME, AS MARITAL PROPERTY TO BE
DIVIDED, RATHER THAN TO ACCEPT THE QUIT-CLAIM DEED
GIVEN BY DEFENDANT TO PLAINTIFF PRIOR TO THE
PARTIES' SEPARATION AND TREAT THE HOME AS
PLAINTIFF'S SEPARATE PROPERTY.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel requires that where a

party (here, the Defendant) has taken a position as to property
in court, and has received a benefit from that position, that he
cannot then change his position in a later court hearing.
Defendant has done just that by saying he transferred the house
to the Plaintiff's name to avoid exposure in a Bankruptcy action,
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and now wants to receive an interest in the house.

Further, when

he transferred the house to his wife's name, he received a
benefit -- the Plaintiff's interest in the family business.

He

should not now benefit from what, in hindsight, appears to be a
bad deal on his part.
III. WHETHER IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE
TRIAL COURT TO DENY PLAINTIFF AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES WHERE THE INCOME OF THE PARTIES
SHOWED HER NEED FOR SUCH AN AWARD, THE
REASONABLENESS OF THE FEES WAS UNDISPUTED AND THE
DEFENDANT'S INCOME SHOWED HE HAD THE ABILITY TO
PAY HER ATTORNEY FEES.
The Utah courts have listed the standard under which
attorney's fees are awarded, and have made it imperative that the
trial court make certain definite findings of fact prior to
coming to its award of attorney's fees.

The trial court did not

make the specific findings, and had the court made those specific
findings, it should have then awarded attorney's fees to the
Plaintiff.
IV.

WHETHER OF NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
JUDGMENT INTEREST ON PAYMENTS TO PLAINTIFF UPON A
JUDGMENT FOR TEMPORARY ALIMONY AWARDED TO HER
PRIOR TO THE TRIAL HEREIN.
The case of Stroud v. Stroud, 738 P.2d 649 (Ut.App.

1987), aff'd 758 P.2d 905 (Utah 1988) is simply one example that
interest on a judgment is a right, and not within the discretion
of a trial court.

When the trial court ordered the Defendant to
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pay to the Plaintiff back alimony owed, it abused its discretion
when it further ordered that the back alimony, which had been
reduced to several final orders, could be paid without interest.
ARGUMENT
I.

WHETHER IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
SET THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY BASED UPON THE PARTIES' STANDARD
OF LIVING PRIOR TO SEPARATION, RATHER THAN ON THE STANDARD
OF LIVING CONSIDERING THE PARTIES' RESPECTIVE INCOMES AT THE
TIME OF TRIAL,.
The standard of review accepted by the Utah Supreme

Court regarding alimony is:
We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on
alimony as long as the court "exercises its discretion
within the bounds and under the standards we have set

and has supported

its

decision

with adequate

findings

and conclusions."
Naranio v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144,
1147 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Davis v. Davis, 749
P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988)).
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 491 (Ut.App. 1991, -emphasis added).
It has been noted by this Court that "[conclusions of
law, however, are reviewed for correctness and given no special
deference on appeal."
(Ut.App. 1991).

Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211

See also Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175

(Utah 1989); Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct.App.
1990) .
The purpose of alimony is to "enable the receiving
spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living

HOAGLAND v. HOAGLAND
Appellant's Brief

Case No. 920340-CA
-9-

enjoyed during the marriage and prevent the spouse from becoming
a public charge."

Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986)

and Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985).

See also

Bushnell v. Bushnell, 649 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah 1982) (same standard
used regarding temporary support).
The case of Howell v. Howell, supra, is a case that
contains many parallels to the instant case, and should be
regarded closely.

In Howell, during the last five years of the

marriage, the Plaintiff's income was five thousand, six hundred
dollars ($5,600) per month, and was at that level when the
parties separated.

However, at the time of trial two years

later, Plaintiff's income had raised to ten thousand, one hundred
and twenty dollars ($10,120) per month.

This Court found that

the large salary increase was due in part to the Plaintiff and
Defendant "having persevered during the lean times", id. at 1212;
much as it was likely the Defendant's experience owning his own
stores that led to his being given the position with Smith's
Management in 1987.
This Court in Howell also held, under the fact
situation before it, that it was inequitable to fix alimony based
simply upon the income at the time of separation.

First, this
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Court held that looking to the time of trial, rather than another
time, given the facts presented,
can properly address what situation would have existed
if the parties had not separated earlier. In this
case, post separation substantial increase in
plaintiff's income was akin to a deferred
income.
In
light of the facts of this case, we conclude that the
trial court erred in looking at the pre-separation
standard of living in setting alimony, but should have
instead considered the standard of living "during the
marriage" up to the time of trial.
Howell, 806 P.2d at 1212 (emphasis added).
In much the same way, in the instant case, the
Defendant was not making much money during the marriage to the
Plaintiff -- their own comparable "lean times" -- but after
moving out of the family home (but prior to requesting a
divorce), Plaintiff began making much better money working for
Smith's Management Corp -- a kind of deferred income.

His

highest salary was in 1990, when he made $73,302 from Smith's.
Tr., p. 12 9.

Income at the time of trial, less because of his

arthritis condition necessitating a job change within Smith's,
was approximately $56,000 per year, more than double the average
salary earned during the marriage of $500 per week.
The Howell decision emphasized several sources as
precedent in coming to their decision on alimony.

One case

cited, Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), discussed
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how alimony should try to "equalize the parties' respective
standards of living enjoyed during the marriage."

Id. at 1081.

In attempting to equalize the standards of living of the
litigants in their case, this Court in Howell compared the
incomes of the two parties as awarded at the time of separation,
and at the time of trial.
In the instant case, if you subtract the trial court's
award of alimony to the Plaintiff, Defendant will still be making
$44,000 per year (not including bonuses), as compared to
Plaintiff's $13,380.00 per year she makes working for the
Internal Revenue Service (plus alimony as awarded by the court).
It is clear that the wide void between the Defendant's income and
the Plaintiff's income is in no way equalized if one takes the
standard of living as being at the time of trial.
Other factors that this Court looked at in the Howell
decision was the fact that the marriage was long-term; the
Plaintiff was "approximately fifty years old, has minimal job
skills," and has worked in the house during most of the marriage;
that the Plaintiff's likelihood of achieving significant salary
levels was slim; and, given these, Plaintiff was only capable of
earning $625.00 per month.
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The fact situation in Howell is remarkably close to
that of the instant case in each of the above-mentioned factors.
At the time of trial, Plaintiff was 56 years of age,

Tr. p. 2,

and had been married to the Defendant for eighteen years, R^ p.
273.

The Defendant's earning capacity (currentLy over $4,500 per

month) far exceeds the Plaintiff's earning capacity ($1,115 per
month).

Given her age and marketable skills, it is unlikely the

Plaintiff will be capable of earning more than she is now.

The

parallels are such that Howell should be used for determination
of the standard of living, e.g. at the time of trial.
Further, Defendant seems to miss the entire reason for
determining alimony from the time of trial rather than from the
time of separation:

judicial economy.

As the Howell court

pointed out, fixing alimony at the time of trial "is further
justified because any future changes in alimony are limited to
instances where a material change in circumstance has occurred."
Id. at 1212.
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that, in similar
fact situations, the standard of living should be placed at a
later time rather than simply "during the marriage."

In Savage

v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983), the Court stated:
Where a marriage is of long duration and the earning
capacity of one spouse greatly exceeds that of the
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other, as here, it is appropriate to order alimony and
child support at a level that will insure that the'
supported spouse and children may maintain a standard
of living not unduly disproportionate to that which
they would have enjoyed had the marriage
continued.
Savacre v. Savage, 658 P.2d at 1205 (emphasis added) . See also
Naranio v. Naranio, supra at 1147 (Utah App. 1988) .
Again, note the factual similarities:

the instant case

deals with a marriage of long duration (18 years), and the
earning capacity of the Defendant greatly exceeds that of the
Plaintiff (over $4,500 per month vs. $1,115 per month).
The reason that the precise definition of "standard of
living enjoyed by the parties during marriage" is not frequently
a problem is that the standard of living at the time of trial is
usually comparable to that which existed during the marriage.
However, the standard that is coming from the appellate courts
leads to a conclusion that long-term marriages in which the
earnings of one of the parties greatly increases, while the other
party has few or no marketable skills, places the point at which
the standard of living is determined at the time of trial.
It should also be noted that determining the standard
of living at the time of trial is consistent with the requirement
that marital assets be valued at the time of trial.
Berber, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985).
Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980).

Berger v.

See also Fletcher v.
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So not only in the interest of justice, but also in the
interest of judicial economy and in response to the requirements
that the Utah appellate courts have placed on the determination
of alimony in cases with similar facts to the instant case,
Plaintiff requests this Court to order alimony to be set
according to the standard of living that existed at the time of
trial.
II.

WHETHER IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
DECLARE THE HOME, CURRENTLY TITLED IN THE PLAINTIFF'S NAME,
AS MARITAL PROPERTY TO BE DIVIDED, RATHER THAN TO ACCEPT THE
QUIT-CLAIM DEED GIVEN BY DEFENDANT TO PLAINTIFF PRIOR TO THE
PARTIES' SEPARATION AND TREAT THE HOME AS PLAINTIFF'S
SEPARATE PROPERTY.
The facts of this case make the distribution of

property, particularly the determination that the Plaintiff's
home is a marital asset, clearly erroneous.
When the Plaintiff and Defendant were married in
September of 1973, they lived in a house owned by the Plaintiff.
Later, the Defendant convinced the Plaintiff to sell her house
and invest the equity into the house which Plaintiff still
inhabits.

In 1978, the Plaintiff and Defendant decided to start

a family partnership to start a grocery business.

That

partnership consisted of the Plaintiff, the Defendant, the
Defendant's brother, and the Plaintiff's son.

Later, when the

Defendant wanted to incorporate the business, he told the
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Plaintiff that he would give her a quit-claim deed to the house
in exchange for her ownership interest in the business.

The

quit-claim deed was given to her at approximately the same time
the business was incorporated.
The Doctrines of Judicial and Quasi Estoppel bar the
defendant from claiming any interest in the house due to the fact
that he quitclaimed the house to his wife in exchange for her
interest in the business he was running.

His stated reason for

doing this was so that he could avoid having to list it as an
asset during the bankruptcy of the business.

He testified that,

when the business was still a partnership, Utah Bank and Trust
wanted him to give it a lien on the house as collateral on the
debt owed by the partnership.

Tr. p. 122.

It was at that point

that he decided that "I could see the bankruptcy coming and
that's when I decided to form the corporate [sic] and quitclaim
the house to my wife."

Tr. p. 122. Creditors did go after his

brother's house after he pledged it as collateral for the debts,
and his brother lost the house.

Tr. p. 123.

By thus disclaiming

any interest in the property in his bankruptcy action, he was
able to save the house from creditors of the business, which
received a discharge from indebtedness.

To award the defendant

an interest in property he previously disclaimed would violate

HOAGLAND v. HOAGLAND

Case No. 920340-CA

Appellant's Brief
-16-

the doctrines of judicial and quasi estoppel and would thereby
allow the defendant to manipulate the legal system in an
unconscionable manner.

The trial court erred in not recognizing

this in its division of marital assets.
Judicial Estoppel or estoppel by record is a doctrine
to protect the integrity of the judicial process from conduct
such as knowing misrepresentation and fraud upon the court.
Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499 (Utah App. 1989).

See also

Total Petroleum, Inc. v. Davis, 822 F.2d 734, 737 n. 6 (8th Cir.
1987).

The Doctrine prevents a party who has obtained relief on

the basis of a representation in court maintaining the opposite
position in another action.

As summarized by the Utah Supreme

Court,
It is well settled that a party who has taken a
position in prior litigation and has obtained relief on
the basis of it cannot maintain the opposite position
in another action.
Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980).

See also

Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah
App. 1990); Roy S. Ludlow Investment Co. v. Salt Lake County, 551
P.2d 1259 (Utah 1976); Mecham v. City of Glendale, 15 Ariz.App.
402, 489 P.2d 65 (Ariz App 1971).
To allow the Defendant to so change his stance that his
conduct amounts to defrauding the Bankruptcy court is just the
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type of action that judicial estoppel as outlined by the Utah
courts is meant to prevent.

Under judicial estoppel, the

Defendant is estopped from claiming any interest in the house.
Even if this court finds that judicial estoppel is not
applicable to the instant case, the case of Hogue v. Hogue, 184
Utah Adv. Rep. 63 (Ut.App. 1992) is helpful in understanding
instances when it is appropriate to establish a home as a marital
asset, and to further distinguish the instant case as an instance
where it would be inappropriate to do so.

The facts in Hogue

were that Mr. Hogue purchased a piece of property, on which he
later built a house.

It was not until later that he married Mrs.

Hogue and she moved into the house with him.

After the marriage,

Mr. Hogue quitclaimed the house to Mrs. Hogue, and later declared
bankruptcy, claiming no interest in the house.

Id., 184 Utah

Adv. Rep. 64. The trial judge declared ,that the house was
marital property.

While this may on the surface have a few

similarities to the instant case (house quitclaimed to wife,
etc.), the reasoning used by the trial court leaves no doubt that
the factual circumstances in Hogue were far different than those
in the instant case.
Specifically, the court found that: (1) Mr. Hogue purchased
the ranch exclusively with money from his business after his
first divorce and before his second marriage to Mrs. Hogue;
(2) Mr. and Mrs. Hogue jointly agreed upon the conveyance of
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the ranch to Mrs. Hogue as a means of protecting the
property from Mr. Hogue's judgment creditors; (3) 'Mr. and
Mrs. Hogue cohabitated together at the ranch for several
months prior to the conveyance of the ranch to Mrs. Hogue;
(4) Mr. and Mrs. Hogue jointly contracted for the purchase
of acreage adjoining the ranch, as well as purchasing
vehicles, trailers, race horses and training and maintenance
equipment to be used on the ranch; and (5) Mr. and Mrs.
Hogue resided at and jointly maintained the ranch for
approximately seven years after the conveyance to Mrs.
Hogue.
Id., 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 65.
Neither the Plaintiff nor the Defendant purchased the
house in the instant case prior to the marriage; it was purchased'
during the marriage.

Had Defendant purchased the property and

house prior to the marriage (as was the case in Hogue), then his
quit claim may not have as much validity.

Further, the facts

presented at trrial do not support the notion that Plaintiff and
the Defendant jointly

agreed to sign the house over to the

Plaintiff to protect it from creditors; the record shows that the
Plaintiff gave up something of value (her share of the
partnership) in exchange for his portion of the house.

While

Plaintiff and Defendant lived in the house during part of the
marriage, it is clear that one reason the Plaintiff stayed in
Ogden was that she considered the house her own house, and did
not want to leave it -- a not altogether unusual response.
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While the trial court did make a finding that the house
was transferred in line with Defendant's reasoning, the facts
presented weighed against it. Again referring to Hogue, the
appellate court may make changes in the trial court's property
division determination if, inter

alia,

preponderated against the findings."

"the evidence clearly
Id., 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at

64, quoting Naranio v. Naranjo, supra at 1146 (Ut.App. 1988) .
It is clear that in this case the finding that the house was
deeded only to avoid creditors was clearly erroneous, and should
be reversed, or remanded for findings of fact in line with the
evidence presented.
III. WHETHER IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
DENY PLAINTIFF AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WHERE THE INCOME
OF THE PARTIES SHOWED HER NEED FOR SUCH AN AWARD, THE
REASONABLENESS OF THE FEES WAS UNDISPUTED AND THE
DEFENDANT'S INCOME SHOWED HE HAD THE ABILITY TO PAY HER
ATTORNEY FEES.
Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Ann., grants to the trial
court the authority to award attorney fees in divorce
proceedings.

This award must be based upon three factors:

(1)

evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse; (2) the
ability of the other spouse to pay, and (3) the reasonableness of
the requested fees.
(Ut.App. 1988).

Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1337

In the case before this Court, the second and

third points are undisputed by Defendant; the question is factor
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number one to determine if attorney fees are justified.

In

determining that attorney fees should not be awarded to either
side, the trial court maintained that with both Plaintiff's
seasonal employment and her alimony as awarded, she made
sufficient income to be able to pay her own attorney's fees.
pp. 3 63-3 64.

R^

However, the trial court did not make a

determination as to reasonableness, and did not address the
Defendant's ability to pay.

The analysis used was not adequate

to determine that there is no need on the part of the Plaintiff
for an award of attorney's fees.

As this Court has held:

To permit meaningful review of the trial court's
discretionary ruling, "[w]e have consistently encouraged
trial courts to make findings and to explain factors which
they considered relevant in arriving at an attorney fee
award." Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d
1210, 1215 (Utah Ct.App. 1989).
•

*

*

The trial court in this case gave no explanation for its
reduction of attorney fees incurred by Wife where their
reasonableness was uncontroverted. Again, the court's failure
to address Wife's need or Husband's ability to pay her
attorney fees leaves us with no adequate explanation for the
court's award.
Bell v. Bell, supra at 494 (Ut.App. 1991).
The trial court's decision to make each party bear their
own attorney's fees leaves the Plaintiff and this reviewing court
with no reasonable explanation as to its actions.

Utah law

mandates that the decision of the trial court in this matter was
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incomplete, and should be reversed or remanded for findings that
are in line with the requirements handed down from the Utah
appellate courts.
IV.

WHETHER OF NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING JUDGMENT
INTEREST ON PAYMENTS TO PLAINTIFF UPON A JUDGMENT FOR
TEMPORARY ALIMONY AWARDED TO HER PRIOR TO THE TRIAL HEREIN.
According to Utah Code Ann., § 15-1-4, unless otherwise

specified by contract, "judgments shall
of 12% per annum."

bear interest at the rate

(Emphasis added) . The meaning of "shall" in a

statute is usually presumed to be mandatory.

Herr v. Salt Lake

County, 525 P.2d 728 (Utah 1974); State v. Ziemer, 10 Utah 2d 45,
347 P.2d 1111

(1960) .

Utah Courts have determined that this

includes alimony judgments.

In the case of Stroud v. Stroud, 758

P.2d 905 (Utah 1988), the Supreme Court affirmed this Court's
ruling

(Stroud v. Stroud, 738 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1987)) that

nterest on final orders on alimony and child support was mandatory.
The language the couit used was unambiguous:
First, the plain, unambiguous language of §15-1-4
[of the Utah Code] prohibits granting the relief
defendant seeks. Indeed, in no uncertain terms, the
subject statute provides that unless otherwise specified,
judgments shall
bear interest at the rate of twelve
percent per annum.
•

•

*

Second, to allow a reduction as defendant wishes
would thwart the intention of the statute by rewarding
those who withhold or are delinquent in child support
payments. This we also will not do.
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Plaintiff is entitled to the statutory rate of
interest on the judgment until payment is made in full.
Stroud, 738 P.2d at 906.
In ruling in its Memorandum Decision that the Defendant
can pay back alimony owed without interest, the trial court was in
clear error.
Section 15-1-4 is not the only statutory language helpful
in determining whether judgment interest was improperly withheld by
the trial court.

According to the trial court, at the time of

trial (October 1991), the Defendant owed the Plaintiff $27,507.00.
R. p. 359.

Of this amount, $21,935.00

had been reduced to

judgment in a hearing held in May 1991. R^ pp. 152-156. According
to §30-3-10.6, every time that the Defendant did not pay Plaintiff
her temporary alimony as ordered, that amount owed would become a
11

judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of

the district court."

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6.

Since the

$27,507.00 spoken of by the trial court was owed to date, it was
clearly arrearages; henceforth, it was obviously late.

In that

case, the Plaintiff, under § 30-3-10.6, had a judgment against the
Defendant in the amount of $27,507.00 when it was due, not just
when the court issued the decree of divorce.

This Court has

recently determined that each of these judgments that occur when
the alimony payment is late is a final judgment, and that interest
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is due on those arrearages. Whitehead v. Whitehead, 193 Utah Adv.
Rep. 8, 10 (Utah App. 1992) .

Therefore, in the interests of

justice, and in compliance with the mandate of Utah statutory law,
the entire $27,507.00 needs to be paid to the Plaintiff at the
legal interest rate.
CONCLUSION
Based

on

the

aforementioned

reasons,

Plaintiff

respectfully requests this Court to remand the final divorce decree
entered in this case to the trial court for a review of the alimony
award, the property distribution, the attorney's fees and costs
award and the payment of interest on the accured back alimony
payments.
Plaintiff further requests that she be awarded attorney
fees and costs on appeal.

She has had to bring this appeal to

defend her property interests at the resolution of this marriage,
and

based

upon

the

foregoing,

frivilously or without foundation.

has

not

brought

this

action

She is still in need of an
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attorney fee award and Defendant has the ability to pay such an
award.
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